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Russia’s Fight for the “Globe” 
 
Yuliya Brel 
 
Abstract 
 
The foreign policy of Russia in the near abroad is the continuation of its domestic 
policy, which includes the consolidation of the population around a leader by 
means of creating an image of an enemy, especially at times when the economic 
situation in the country is deteriorating. When interpreting the inner processes in 
the country, political scientists usually apply the decomposition of the totalitarian 
Soviet regime as a framework. This paper suggests a broader framework through 
an analysis of historical structures anchored in Russian civilization. The key to 
understanding Russia's foreign policy, I argue, is rooted in the imperial syndrome 
associated with the country’s history, whether one considers the tsarist, Soviet, or 
post-Soviet periods. At present, Russia’s desire to restore its status as a world 
power, as in the past, requires it to develop a foreign policy secured by control of 
its nearest neighbors. For centuries, it purchased their loyalty and fealty with 
natural resources. When this routine was disrupted, for example with a drop in the 
market prices of raw materials, another practice developed where, in order to 
maintain its hegemony, Russia used aggression against its nearest neighbors. This 
approach is sustained by endorsement from the general public that seems oblivious 
to conditions of unparalleled income inequality in Russia. For them there is 
nostalgia for the restoration of a super power status for the country. The chief 
outcome of the study is Russian policies of self-isolation and hybrid wars against 
its nearest neighbors, which is a contemporary means used to prolong the life of an 
imagined empire. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
On November 30, 2016, the United States House of Representatives approved the 
Intelligence Authorization Bill. Title V of the bill (Matters Relating to Foreign 
Countries) specified the creation of an interagency committee “to counter active 
measures by the Russian Federation to exert covert influence over peoples and 
governments” (Civic Impulse, 2017, p. 53). The matter concerned the disclosure of 
disinformation and forgeries, funding agents of influence, assassinations, terrorism, 
and other activities of the kind “carried out in coordination with, or at the behest of, 
political leaders or the security services of the Russian Federation” (Civic Impulse, 
2017, pp. 53-54).  
Clearly, a full 180-degree turn in the Russian-American relations was not an 
instantaneous event. Initially there was little portent of going back to the active 
phase of the Cold War in U.S. relations with Putin’s Russia. After September 11, 
2001, Putin was the first to call American President George W. Bush to express his 
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condolences and to declare his readiness to render assistance in fighting terrorism. 
Shortly after that, following the announcement by President Bush of the United 
States’ intent to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (Arms 
Control Association, 2002), and the International Security Conference in Munich 
in 2002 (Schwartz, 2002), relations began to take a turn for the worse. Five years 
later, at the Munich Security Conference of 2007 Putin announced that the unipolar 
model of the modern world was unacceptable for Russia. He emphasized that Russia 
“[was] a country with more than a millennial history, and [that] it almost always 
enjoyed the privilege of conducting an independent foreign policy” (Putin, 2007). 
Although Russian leadership might perceive NATO membership as consistent with 
a unipolar vision, in March 2009, Radoslaw Sikorski, the Polish Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, talked about his desire to see Russia among the NATO member-nations 
(Gołota & Wroński, 2009). In spite of numerous reservations, such a possibility was 
also left open by Dmitry Rogozin, the Permanent Representative of the NATO 
Response Force, in April 2009 (Rogozin, 2009).  
 The seeming point of no return in the Russian-American relations was 
passed in March 2014 after the annexation of the Crimea by Russia. In light of 
perceived United States support for the overthrow of Ukrainian President Viktor 
Yanukovych, the prospects of an anti-Russian government in Ukraine, and the 
potential loss of Crimean ports for the Russian Black Sea Fleet, Putin justified the 
actions of Russia as a necessity to protect the population of the Crimea from the 
repressions and reprisal raids of the Ukrainian radicals (Putin, 2014). According to 
independent analysts and political writers, such a U-turn in Russia’s foreign policy 
was inevitable (Gudkov, 2016; Klyamkin, 2014). These analysts regard the change 
as a resort to traditional means, i.e. the use of aggression and conducting hybrid 
wars against the nearest neighbors, for solving internal problems. 
In this article, I will first explore the idea that in its development Russia goes 
through the cycles of reforms and counter-reforms, which help preserve the 
historical status quo in Russian society. I will also consider how the consolidation 
of Russian society is attained by creating the perpetual image of an external enemy. 
This image appeals to the people’s perception of the country as an imperial nation 
and a world power. “Splendid little wars” against real or imagined enemies give the 
Russian authorities an opportunity to distract the population from the internal 
problems. The economy is a major part of this argument. The question of “whether 
Moscow will be able to handle [this] strategic over-extension, which entails the use 
of considerable resources while its economy is in bad shape” looms large (Scimia, 
2017). Arguably, economic problems in Russia occasionally stem from its 
intermediate geopolitical and cultural position between the West and the East that 
at times have impeded trade relations.  
Utilizing primarily web-based sources from Russian scholars in order to 
provide readers with easily accessible references (many of these works are also 
published in printed form), I will also examine how the characteristics of the 
cultural core of the Russian civilization that have contributed to its survival for 
millennia, actually stymie creativity in the 21st century. By reviewing the theories 
of Russian historians, philosophers, sociologists, and political scientists, and by 
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analyzing the outcomes of public opinion polls, as well as statistical and economic 
data, I show that when change does come, it is derivative. This tendency to adapt 
from external sources bears the seeds of its own destruction due to the persistence 
of reactionary forces against change in the society. I will conclude with some 
thoughts about how Russia compensates for its inability to exert “soft power” on its 
nearest neighbors, and what the country’s current development prospects are.  
 
Literature Review 
 
One of the explanatory models of social transformations in the history of Russia is 
the theory of the “civilizational pendulum” or “cyclic recurrence of history” offered 
by Bagdasaryan (2010). According to the model, “the direction in which 
development moves at a particular historical stage is determined by the combination 
of the innovational and traditional potentials” (Bagdasaryan, 2010, p. 61). When the 
former potential prevails (often inspired by external forces), the system becomes 
transformed. Innovations, however, incite rejection and set the countermove of the 
pendulum mechanism in motion. In this sense, crises can be regarded as the 
maximum swing points of the pendulum. Thus, “when the maximum of the 
innovation amplitude has been reached, the vector of the social development 
inevitably gives way to the opposite one,” which leads to the periods of counter 
reforms in Russia (Bagdasaryan, 2010, pp. 61-62).  
The idea that in its development Russia goes through cycles of reforms and 
counter-reforms is supported by the sociologist Vladimir Lapkin and the political 
scientist Vladimir Pantin (2007). Their work connects the problem of Russia’s 
image with reactionary domestic and foreign policies developed by the authorities. 
Policies that the authors single out emphasize the “intermediate,” “borderline” 
geopolitical and cultural position of Russia between the West and the East, whereby 
“the image of Russia inside and outside the country somehow bifurcates and 
fluctuates” (Lapkin & Pantin, 2007, pp. 1-2).  
Lapkin and Pantin (2007) further argue that during the periods of liberal 
reforms, Russian society and the state “primarily consider themselves closely 
connected to European culture, and more broadly to the West,” signaling their 
equality with the “civilized world” (pp. 2-3). At such times, the West tends to 
perceive Russia as not posing any real threats, though “lagging behind” the civilized 
world. On the contrary, when the Russian state goes through periods of anti-liberal 
counter reforms, its “separate identity” and civilizational differences from both the 
West and the East begin to be emphasized. These are also the times that tend to 
accentuate Russia’s “greatpowerness, uniqueness, imperial might” as well as its 
“special messianic role in the world process (Lapkin and Pantin, 2007, p. 3). At 
such moments the West sees Russia “largely as an independent, but hostile and 
unpredictable nation whose political and economic life is significantly different 
from life in western countries” (p. 3). Relatedly, Bagdasaryan (2010) highlights a 
set of indicators that directly lead to an increase in external aggression. Those are 
the level of national focus versus the level of cosmopolitism; the etatism paradigm 
(the popularity of the strong state concept); the propaganda actualization of the 
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external enemy image (the West), and the nature of defining Russia’s historical 
mission, among others (Bagdasaryan, 2010, p. 64). 
The historian Alexander Akhiezer (1995) regarded Russia as having an 
intermediate position between liberal and traditional civilizations (p. 4). In its 
historic development Russia stepped over the bounds of a traditional civilization 
characterized by static reproduction, i.e. the type of reproduction under which 
quantitative changes in society and culture are possible only at the expense of 
attracting additional resources. However, Russia did not manage to become a full-
fledged part of Western liberal civilization where the dominant position is held by 
intensive reproduction fueled by innovation. Situated between such forces, societal 
dynamics acquired a conflict-ridden, self-destructive character which Akhiezer 
(1995) called “cleavage” (p. 6).  
Cleavage is “a pathological condition of society” characterized by a vicious 
circle, which means that if progressive values in one of the two parts of the cleaved 
society are activated, in the other part traditional forces are brought into action, and 
vice versa (Akhiezer, 1995, p. 6). Akhiezer (1995) argues that the two opposing 
parts in the cleaved society (progressive values vs. traditional values) act in the 
opposite directions and thus paralyze and disorganize each other (p. 6).  
In a cleavage-based society any attempts to substitute alternative decisions for 
those just taken may form the so-called “lame decisions” (Akhiezer, 1995, p. 32). 
The latter are characterized by simplification–a tendency to solve not what needs to 
be solved, but what can be solved according to the understanding of the authorities 
(Akhiezer, 1995, p. 34). This tendency coincides with Herbert Simon’s idea of 
“satisficing.” Satisficing refers to making decisions, which are just good enough in 
terms of some criterion (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2009, p. 348). Lame decisions make 
the authorities “pursue a ‘satisficing’ path, a path that will permit satisfaction at 
some specified level of all of [their] needs” (Simon, 1956, p. 136). The project 
Novorossia envisaging the creation of a confederative union of the unrecognized 
Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics may serve as an example in this case. At 
the initial stage (May 2014), it was actively supported by the Kremlin. However, 
having encountered resistance on the part of the West and the impossibility of 
spreading the Donetsk-Lugansk experience over the contiguous regions of Ukraine, 
the project was closed a year later.  
According to the Russian historian Nikolai Berdyaev (2007), the immense 
space of Russia subjugates the “Russian soul” instead of emancipating it (p. 115).  
Organization of the vast space into the greatest state in the world was paid for by 
over-centralization, “submission of life to the state’s interests, and suppression of 
any independent forces, personal as well as public” (Berdyaev, 2007, p. 114). 
Berdyaev (2007) wrote the collection of articles, The Destiny of Russia (1914-
1917), before the end of World War I. He hoped that the war would lead to “a radical 
change in the consciousness of the Russian people” (Berdyaev, 2007, p. 120). They 
would disengage from the power of space, and instead get control over it. This 
would allow them to radically change their attitude to the state and culture. Instead 
of being their master, the state should become “the inner power of the Russian 
people” (Berdyaev, 2007, p. 120). As for culture, in the opinion of Berdyaev (2007), 
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it was supposed to become “more intensive” (p. 120). Without such a change “the 
Russian people cannot have a future … and the state is exposed to the threat of 
disintegration” (Berdyaev, 2007, p. 120). The philosopher’s hopes were not 
destined to be realized. During the 20th century the state disintegrated twice. That 
is why the fight for Russia’s global status still remains a main factor in the process 
of consolidation for an atomized people who never managed (not without the 
assistance of the state) to acquire the skills of collective action.  
The problem of consolidation is pertinent to any society that has transitioned 
from a traditional civilization to a liberal one. However, for Russia which is stuck 
in-between, it is exacerbated by the cleavage or tensions between innovation and 
tradition, between foreign and domestic. To overcome it, it is necessary to reach a 
basic consensus between the conflicting cultures and their bearers, further providing 
legitimacy to the state power (Akhiezer, Klyamkin, & Yakovenko, 2013, p. 45). In 
early states, the legitimacy of the ruling stratum was determined by how successful 
it was at coping with the protection of its subjects from external threats, and by its 
ability to annex new territories. That is why “victories in wars were a powerful 
source of the state power legitimacy” (Akhiezer et al., 2013, p. 44). In the words of 
Akhiezer, Klyamkin, and Yakovenko (2013), “the fall of European monarchies 
(German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian) … during WW I proved that the ancient 
mechanism when power could be legitimized by means of victories and de-
legitimized by means of defeats continued to exist even millennia later” (p. 44).  
These authors also contend that “the state consolidation through the image of an 
enemy–real or simulated–has not been eliminated until now” (Akhiezer et al., 2013, 
p. 44). Therefore, victories in wars gave Russia an opportunity to establish and 
support its notion of imperial might legitimizing the ruling elite.  
Wars, however, could also be “a specific means to obscure internal problems, 
which under the condition of peace reveal[ed] their intractability and insolvability 
… and the hidden cracks of the socio-cultural cleavage” (Akhiezer et al., 2013, p. 
45). Also, the vast expanse of the Russian territory did not require much investment 
from its inhabitants. It has always been possible for the state to secure additional 
resources to enhance production in society making innovation unnecessary or at 
least less attractive. Nevertheless, Russia’s position as an intermediary civilization 
forced the country to go through cycles of reforms and counter-reforms in the course 
of its history. The periods of reforms drew Russia nearer to the “civilized world,” 
i.e. to the Western European culture, whereas the periods of counter-reforms incited 
in the population the ideas of Russia’s uniqueness and aspirations for the country’s 
messianic role in the world.  
 
Analysis 
 
In the remaining part of my article I will show how and why the population of 
Russia currently tends to support the aggressive foreign policy of the Kremlin. The 
following analysis of public opinion polls and of the statistical and economic data 
shows that while previously the Russian authorities ensured support of constituents 
by improving their well-being, the main focus of the current domestic policy is to 
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create an image of an external enemy (or enemies). This helps politicians to distract 
the masses from recognizing that Russia has been unable to create a competitive 
economy. By involving the population in foreign policy endeavors, which propel 
dangerous dreams about the restoration of the country's former greatness and status 
as a world power, elites are trying to divert the people’s attention from the fact that 
the Russian economy is currently suffering from three ongoing crises (Mirkin, 
2017). The first one is the investment crisis; the second is connected with the drop 
in the population’s real income that continues for the fourth consecutive year; the 
third is the overpriced Russian ruble, which may become devalued at any moment. 
In addition, the modern Russian economy is still mostly extractive, which makes 
Russia “a great state of raw materials” unable to compete with either “the Asian 
electronic ‘tigers’” or other developed countries of the world (Mirkin, 2017).  
 
Negative Mobilization 
 
In his book Negative Identity (2004), the Russian sociologist Lev Gudkov noted the 
following, “Consolidation of the Russians happens not on the basis of positive ideas 
… but on the solidarity of repulsion, denial, and demarcation. It is a deep cultural 
circumstance rather than manifestation of an opportunistic potential of collective 
mobilization” (p. 156). Therefore, the most important condition for the reproduction 
of the negative identity is the presence of the image of an “enemy” (an “alien”). It 
affixes wholeness and stability to the national identity. Gudkov provides a useful 
theory about how negative mobilization forms. He identifies three conditions 
conducive to the forming of mobilization waves in the Russian society. First of all, 
negative mobilization begins only when the differentiation and sophistication of the 
social system reaches such a degree under which the commanding top begins to lose 
control over what is going on. Secondly, under such conditions the processes of 
structured changes turn out to be blocked by the interests of some influential groups. 
Thirdly, the intellectual elite degenerate since they become little other than 
bureaucrats serving the regime (Gudkov, 2004, p. 484).  
The data in Table 1 help assess the effectiveness of Russia’s aggressive foreign 
policy with respect to the perception of the political elite by the population of the 
country. The coercive annexation of the Crimea had a positive impact on Putin’s 
rating, although many remained relatively low. 
The first column shows the results of the survey which was conducted under 
the conditions of a deep economic crisis five months before the default.1 Public 
opinion perceived the authorities of Yeltsin’s call-out as corrupted (63%) and alien 
to the people (41%). During the “fat” years of Putin’s rule the population’s 
                                                           
1 The sovereign default occurred in Russian on August 17, 1998. The main reasons for the 
default (the inability to service some or all the country’s fiscal obligations) were as follows: 
an enormous state debt; low world prices for raw materials, which made the basis of the 
Russian export; the peanut politics of the state; the establishment by the state of the Ponzi 
scheme, which refers to a fraudulent investing scam; and the meltdown of the Asian 
economies. 
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perception of the authorities improved, but not significantly or in all categories. 
Comparing the data in the last two columns it is necessary to keep in mind that by 
November 2016 the real income of the population had been decreasing for 24 
consecutive months. Nevertheless, the share of Russians characterizing the 
authorities in a negative way substantially decreased. 
Table 1 
Please name the traits that in your opinion characterize the current 
authorities (percentage of the number of respondents)2 
 
 March 
1998 
November 
2012 
November 
2016 
Corrupted 63 52 31 
Bureaucratic 22 30 26 
Legitimate 12 8 23 
Alien to the people 41 32 23 
Strong, firm 2 10 19 
‘Ours,’ habitual 3 4 11 
Authoritative, 
respected 
2 6 11 
Note. Adapted from Levada-Center (2016a). 
 
The figures in the last column support the idea of Akhiezer et al. (2013) about 
wars being a convenient means for the authorities to distract the population from 
internal problems (p. 45). Russian rulers have always skillfully played the strings 
of the people’s “deeply-rooted patriotic sentiment” knowing for centuries that the 
population possessed “a strong resilience to material shortages” (Scimia, 2017).  
Thus, the events in Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimea turned out to be a 
consolidating factor for the Russian society, at least for the time being. However, 
the countdown of shaping the current mobilization wave should be taken not from 
March 2014 and the annexation, but from the end of 2011 when in response to mass 
protests against rigging the election outcomes, the Kremlin began to renew the 
policy of societal consolidation (in opposition to external threats). The central 
element of the new policy became the anti-West rhetoric.  
                                                           
2 The survey was conducted on November 18-21, 2016, using an all-Russian representative 
sampling of the urban and rural population. The number of respondents equaled 1,600 people 
aged 18 and older. The survey was conducted at respondents’ homes using face-to-face 
interviews. The six answer options given in the table were the most popular ones in 
November 2016.  
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The beginning of Vladimir Putin’s third presidential term (March 2012) 
coincided with a sharp slowdown in the economic growth, which served as an 
additional incentive to form an image of an enemy. The dynamics of answering the 
question, “Are things in Russia going in the right direction or are the events leading 
us nowhere?” illustrate the connection between the external “splendid little wars” 
and positive assessments by mass consciousness of the state of affairs inside the 
country (Levada Center, 2016b, p. 33). The two most important peaks of positive 
assessments were recorded in August 2008 (“peace-enforcement of Georgia”), and 
after the annexation of the Crimea in March 2014.  
 
State Cultural Policy 
 
In December 2014, Putin approved Foundations of the State Cultural Policy (FSCP) 
decree. The document consists of 72 pages. The word “civilization” is mentioned 
in it 30 times. According to the authors of the document, Russia is a unique and 
authentic civilization, which reduces itself to neither “the West” nor “the East” 
(FSCP, 2015, p. 30). It is a bridge between the neighbors on “the left” and on “the 
right” (FSCP, 2015, p. 30). Civilizational authenticity is secured by means of 
transferring from generation to generation the traditional values, norms, mores, and 
patterns of the country’s behavior (FSCP, 2015, pp. 26, 44). It is identified as a 
priority of the cultural and humanitarian development (FSCP, 2015, p. 9). At the 
same time, there was no space in the voluminous document to articulate the content 
of “civilizational authenticity” (FSCP, 2015, p. 3). The only exception was Russian 
mentality. Its main characteristic was a pronounced priority of the spiritual over 
material (FSCP, 2015, p. 31). The absence of any detailed description of the FSCP 
characteristics is evidence of the declarative nature of the document that presages a 
propaganda campaign for confrontation with the “other,” specifically Western 
Europe and the United States.  
Thus, a concise wording of the document’s main thesis would be “Russia is not 
Europe” (Bershidsky, 2014). Although Putin has mentioned it many times in his 
speeches that Russia had civilizational differences with the West, according to 
Bershidsky (2014), the FSCP officially enshrined Russia’s “rejection of the 
European path and of universal values such as democratic development and 
tolerance toward different cultures” (n.p.).  
Three factors seem to come into play with respect to “Russia’s non-European 
path” (Bershidsky, 2014). First of all, it is a quest for security from terrorist attacks, 
as well as from internal breakdown, and a perceived threat from the West. Secondly, 
it is Russia’s sense of uniqueness with its growing rejection of Western values and 
the idea that “Russian civilization can develop along the lines of a limited federation 
of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus” (Johnson, 2014). Finally, it is an imbedded 
ideology growing out of Russia’s vastness that centralized governance is necessary, 
accepted, and even preferred, which in turn contributes to greater police powers on 
the part of the state. 
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The Russian Economy 
 
The central idea of the cultural program seems to be accurate–Russia is a separate 
civilization. This distinct civilization has survived over the course of its millennial 
history thanks to this identity. In the article The Clash of Civilizations? Samuel 
Huntington (1993) stated that when the Cold War ended and ideological division of 
Europe disappeared, the region became divided in a cultural way (p. 29). The 
division now was between Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodox 
Christianity and Islam on the other (pp. 29-30) The important dividing line in 
Europe “may well be the eastern boundary of Western Christianity in the year 1500” 
(Huntington, 1993, p. 30). Thus, the peoples who live to the north and west of this 
line are either Protestants or Catholics. In the course of their history they went 
through the same stages as other Western European countries, i.e. feudalism, the 
Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution 
(Huntington, 1993, p. 30). They were also generally better off than those who lived 
to the east. Therefore, Huntington (1993) predicted that those peoples would “look 
forward to increasing involvement in a common European economy and to the 
consolidation of democratic political systems” (p. 30). The Orthodox and Muslim 
peoples to the east and south of the line “were only lightly touched by the shaping 
events in the rest of Europe; [were] generally less advanced economically; [and] 
seemed much less likely to develop stable political systems” (pp. 30-31). In full 
compliance with Huntington’s logic, the three former Baltic republics of the Soviet 
Union focused on the integration with Europe, and “quickly evolved into genuine 
and, in many respects, liberal democracies” (Diamond, 2008, p. 190). The six 
republics with predominantly Muslim populations reverted to sultanic-like regimes 
with strong individual rulers. The six Orthodox republics proclaimed commitment 
to the principles of democracy on the forefront of the Perestroika euphoria; 
however, they did not manage to realize them consistently in practice. Eventually, 
with the exception of the Baltic States, all other former Soviet republics and “most 
prominently Russia … regressed from democratic possibilities or reestablished 
dictatorship without communism” (Diamond, 2008, p. 190).  
The authors of FSCP, however, consider the cultural peculiarity of Russia as 
the guarantor of the Russian statehood stability and competitiveness (FSCP, 2015 
p. 49). Official economic statistics, on the contrary, do not confirm the presence of 
such competitiveness. Modern Russia, just like the Soviet Union before it, suffers 
from what Larry Diamond (2008) called “the exceptional curse of oil” (p. 74).  
Already the economy of the Soviet Union after the discovery of the oil and gas 
fields in Western Siberia began to sweepingly acquire the structure characteristic of 
a petro-state. Therefore, it is not by accident that “the largest geopolitical 
catastrophe” of the 20th century started in 1985 after an almost six-fold drop in oil 
prices (Putin, 2005). 
The modern Russian economy has been substantially dependent on oil prices 
as well. In the words of the program director of Moscow Carnegie Center Movchan 
(2017), in Russia in 2008 the correlation between the changes in oil prices made up 
between 90% and 95% of the changes in the GDP growth rate, the federal budget 
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income, and the size of reserves (p. 5). According to the Russian Ministry of 
Finance, in 2014, 35.4% of the federal budget revenue came directly from the export 
of petroleum. Value-added tax received from selling imported goods, most of which 
(92%) were paid for with the money received from exporting raw materials, made 
up additional 15% of the budget (Movchan, 2017, p. 7). Also, taxes, levies, and 
payments for natural resources equaled 20% of the budget, with excise and other 
duties on imported goods adding another 13%. Altogether, in 2014, “83.4% of the 
federal budget income was made up by the revenue from the extraction and export 
of raw materials” (Movchan, 2017, p. 7).  
It would be a mistake to think that an increase in the general income of the 
Russian population occurred because the state managed to create a competitive 
industrial sphere. The increase should be first accounted for by the export of oil, the 
extraction of which makes up about 20% of the Russian GDP. Another factor 
explaining the increase in the income is the outpacing consumption growth, which 
is fueled by trade “blown out of proportions due to the huge petrodollars flow of 
import” (Movchan, 2017, p. 6). Citing the data of the Federal Service of State 
Statistics (Rosstat), Movchan (2017) indicated that by 2014 Russia was importing 
from 85% to 95% of production means, and from 50% to 70% of consumption 
goods (p. 6).  
A growth in the income of the Russians during the 2000s did not contradict 
such a roll back as it was ensured mainly at the expense of the raw material rent.  
The latter, however, is threatened today not only by the unfavorable demand-supply 
situation but also by the deepening technological underrun. The methods of oil 
extraction used in Russia are inefficient from the point of view of oil recovery 
factor, which is on average 30% lower today than in the United States and is slowly 
decreasing, whereas in the United States it is slowly growing. The maximum 
possible extraction in Russia will decline and, according to some estimates, will 
dwindle at least two times by 2035 (Poddubny, 2011, pp. 85-103).  
Russia’s rejection of a planned economy and the shift to the market were 
supposed to promote the development of knowledge intensive branches of industry. 
In practice, however, the situation was reversed. According to the data of the 
Russian Machine-Building Portal (2013), for the last 20 years the production of 
processing units in Russia decreased almost 20 times: from 70,000 to 3,000. They 
assert that the decline should be attributed to the political events that led to the 
change in the country’s economic set-up in the 1990s, which “made most of the 
machine-tool building enterprises in Russia bankrupt or put them on the verge of 
bankruptcy” ( Machine-Building Portal, 2013).  
Machine building, however, is the core of modern industry. It is impossible to 
create a modern economy without it. That is why the federal program National 
Technological Base adopted in 2006 and intended for the time frame of 2007-2011 
was specifically earmarked to breathe new life into such an important branch of 
industry (Government, 2007). The program did not produce the expected outcome, 
and could not produce it. This is a direct consequence of Russia’s inability to 
introduce quantitative changes into the economy by means of innovation. The 
situation was also aggravated by the brain drain from the country and the overall 
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low ranking of most Russian universities. According to a report by Russia’s 
Committee of Civil Initiatives, human capital is actively leaving the country, and 
the “quality losses due to emigration that the domestic human capital is 
experiencing are significant and cannot be replenished at the expense of external 
resources” (Vorobieva & Grebeniuk, 2016, p. 25). Only between 2002 and 2011, 
93,000 Russians with degrees emigrated from the Russian Federation (Vorobieva 
& Grebeniuk, 2016, p. 25). This process of washing out the most “educated, 
proactive and motivated” citizens continues (Abramov, 2016). Also, according to 
the 2017 ShanghaiRanking Academic Ranking of 500 world’s top universities, 
Russia’s best university (Lomonosov Moscow State University) ranked 93 
(ARWU, 2017). Its second best higher education establishment, Saint Petersburg 
State University, found itself 400th (ARWU, 2017). Therefore, the absence of a 
competitive industrial sphere and the non-competitiveness of the Russian economy 
were not aided by government policy. Policies that isolate Russia from the world 
community of nations are counter-productive. Over-reliance on natural resources 
and military force are also misguided. Russia’s government and leadership have 
been astute at capitalizing on traditional fears and mistrust of the other, strategies 
that have long been employed in Russia to its own detriment.  
In April 1985, Gorbachev began Perestroika with “uskoreniye,” which can be 
translated into English as “acceleration.” The term refers to the initial stage of 
Gorbachev’s reforms when the Soviet government was trying to expedite the social 
and economic development of the country, thus acknowledging that the USSR had 
been lagging behind the Western countries in that respect. The machine 
manufacturing industry was supposed to play the central role in the process of 
acceleration of the economic development, propelling a quick switch to totally new 
technologies. The outcome of the attempt was illustrated by the examples cited 
above. There is no quick fix and yet people are impatient. Russia’s leadership has 
tended to opt for the expedient low hanging options over the hard work of human 
resource development and partnership building. Twenty-five years of the 
contemporary history of the Russian Federation reflects 25 years of accelerated de-
industrialization. That is why the breakaway from the industrially developed 
countries is growing with every passing year.  
 
Consolidation without "soft power" 
 
The practice of consolidating periphery around the imperial core at the expense of 
redistribution of the natural resource rent is centuries-old. Let us consider the Soviet 
period. In her book To Feed and to Govern: About Power in Russia in the 16th 
through 20th Centuries, Tamara Kondratieva (2006) shows on numerous examples 
how beginning with the Middle Ages, when Russian feudal lords would give their 
noble servants lands “to feed” upon them, the concept of “feeding” emerged (p. 7). 
“Governing” the lands was secondary. Thus, according to the Russian historian 
Kluchevsky, in the Russian history the formation of power relationships happened 
in this order: first came feeding, then governing (Kondratieva, 2006, p. 7).  
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The tradition continued into the modern times when the new symbiotic 
formation of the party-state became the only owner of the country’s riches and 
distributor of the material benefits. The “owner” determined his monopoly power 
at the individual level, in the first place, by means of distributing produce and 
manufactured goods depending on the social status, labor significance, and political 
orientation of citizens (Kondratieva, 2006). After the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, the “feeding” practice transformed into purchasing the loyalty of the 
periphery with the help of natural resources by the imperial core. If purchasing the 
loyalty of its nearest neighbors was not feasible, Russia resorted to such pressuring 
means as direct threats and military interventions. Russia has to employ either of 
the options because it simply does not possess soft power, if one understands by it 
“getting others to want what you want” by means of “cultural attraction, ideology, 
and international institutions” (Nye, 1990, p. 167).  
The diverse relations between Russia and its nearest neighbors are examples of 
different degrees of success and failure of the feeding/purchasing practice. Russia, 
for instance, was not able to hold the Baltic States in its sphere of influence by 
means of the pre-dosed “feeding.” That is why the latter opted for NATO umbrella 
to retain their independence. In the cases of Ukraine and Georgia, the refusal to 
exchange one’s loyalty for “feeding” resulted in Russia exercising military power 
to keep the former Soviet republics within its circle of influence.  
The union state of Belarus and Russia may serve, however, as an example of 
efficiency of “feeding.” Its history (founded on April 2, 1997) is first of all the 
history of oil and gas trade “wars” whose essence boils down to the struggle of 
political elites for the “fair” distribution of the resource rent. The last trade war, 
unprecedented with respect to its duration, had started in the summer of 2016 and 
ended only in April of 2017. The reason for noncompliance is self-explanatory. The 
drop in the world prices for energy supply considerably decreased the subsidizing 
abilities of the Russian budget. For Lukashenko, the head of the Belarusian state, 
the present level of subsidies means the loss of social and political stability in the 
country. 
Although Russia is unable to recruit allies from its immediate circle with “soft 
power,” it nevertheless aspires to “the world cultural expansion” (FSCP, 2015, p. 
39). The official civilizational optimism recorded by FSCP finds neither 
understanding nor support from the majority of liberal-minded Russians. They call 
for reforming the state and its base institutions towards more inclusive, empowering 
democratic institutions and market economy. For instance, here are the suggestions 
of the politician and economist Yavlinsky (2017) that he enumerated in his article 
on the outcomes of the latest Gaidar Forum: 
 
• changing the domestic and foreign policy, abolition of repressive 
laws, emancipation of mass media, and fence-mending with the 
nearest neighbors and the rest of the world; 
• emancipation and encouragement of entrepreneurial initiative; 
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• creation of favorable institutional environment for business that would 
presuppose opportunities for business to legally and openly participate 
in the political life of the country; 
• provision of maximally competitive environment in all spheres; and 
• forming of the so-called “development institutes” whose task would 
be to encourage long-term investment, and using for this purpose the 
largest part of the state’s rent income.  
For Yavlinsky (2017), there is “overconcentration of power, [with] its non-
transparency and irremovability, and the absence of political competition, checks 
and balances.” All these obstacles turn the implementation of reforms into mission 
impossible.  
One may, however, argue about the efficiency of such obvious suggestions. 
The overconcentration of the Russian power did not come from nowhere. As it was 
rightly noted by the historian Vladimir Buldakov (2007), power in Russia is “a 
derivative from the people’s ideas about it” (p. 22). The way it is formed is difficult 
to grasp from the sociological point of view (Buldakov, 2007, p. 22). That is why 
any attempts at reforming the Russian state by virtue of direct impact on power are 
a priori doomed to failure.  
 
Conclusion 
 
On the one hand, in its domestic policy Russia puts a premium on the struggle for 
retaining traditional values, which is an unmistakable sign of the loss of the 
historical dynamics, i.e. change. Culture is not static. Russia’s foreign policy, on 
the other hand, is anchored by control of its nearest neighbors. Having gone through 
the disintegration of the empire, the former imperial nation suffers from the 
wounded grandeur complex, which makes it an easy prey for politicians willing to 
draw the people in dangerous foreign policy enterprises. Being unable to exert “soft 
power” on the immediate neighbors, Russia compensates for it in two ways: by 
either purchasing the loyalty of the regimes ready to sacrifice part of their 
sovereignty in exchange for economic subsidies (Belarus, Armenia), or by the direct 
military interference (Georgia, Ukraine).  
The idea of a super power has indeed proved to be much-in-demand for the 
masses. Therefore, one of the country’s prospects is the continuation of the self-
isolation policy (de facto or chosen), coupled with hybrid wars. This policy, 
however, limits Russia’s potential for development by stifling the ingenuity of 
citizens’ entrepreneurial spirit. Although it may help prolong the life of an imagined 
empire, in reality it does not contribute to Russia’s greatness. Another choice for 
Russia could be the transformation into a liberal civilization, which will most 
probably demand a change in civilizational identity, as well as the acceptance of 
universal values such as respect for human rights and dignity, and so on. Time will 
show whether Russia will choose innovation over tradition, or vice versa; and 
whether it will attempt to join the “civilized world” yet again, or will continue to 
lead a wretched existence on the historic sidelines.  
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